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"Person" defined.

The word "person" wherever used in this chapter, shall be construed to
mean any person, partnership, joint stock company, unincorporated association or society, or municipal or other corporation of any character whatsoever.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-33-13.

Cross-References. - Corporations, Title
16.
Partnerships, Title 48.

I

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 22 Am. Jur. 2d Declaratory
Judgments § 79.
C.J.S. - 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments
§ 117 et seq.

Key Numbers. - Declaratory Judgment®=>
291.

CHAPTER 34
EMINENT DOMAIN
Section
78-34-1. Uses for which right may be exercised.
78-34-2. Estates and rights that may be
taken.
78-34-3. Private property which may be
taken.
78-34-4. Conditions precedent to taking.
78-34-5. Right of entry for survey and location.
78-34-6. Complaint - Contents.
78-34-7. Who may appear and defend.
78-34-8. Powers of court or judge.
78-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending action - Deposit paid into court
- Procedure for payment of
compensation.
78-34-10. Compensation and damages - How
assessed.
78-34-11. When right to damages deemed to
have accrued.
78-34-12. When title sought found defective Another action allowed.

78-34-1.

Section
78-34-13. Payment of award- Bond from railroad to secure fencing.
78-34-14. Distribution of award - Execution
-Annulment
of proceedings on
failure to pay.
78-34-15. Judgment of condemnation - Recordation - Effect.
78-34-16. Substitution of bond for deposit paid
into court - Abandonment of
action by condemner - Conditions of dismissal.
78-34-17. Rights of cities and towns not affected.
78-34-18. When right of way acquired - Duty
of party acquiring.
78-34-19. Action to set aside condemnation for
failure to commence or complete construction within reasonable time.
78-34-20. Sale of property acquired by condemnation.

Uses for which right may be exercised.

Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent domain may
be exercised in behalf of the following public uses:
(1) all public uses authorized by the Government of the United States.
(2) public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other
public uses authorized by the Legislature.
(3) public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city or
incorporated town, or board of education; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts,
flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any county or city or incorporated town, or for the draining of any
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county, city or incorporated town; the raising of the banks of streams,
removing obstructions therefrom, and widening, deepening or straightening their channels; roads, streets and alleys; and all other public uses for
the benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, or the inhabitants
thereof.
(4) wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads,
byroads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction
engines or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and
railroads and street railways for public transportation.
(5) reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and pipes for the supplying of persons, mines, mills, smelters or
other works for the reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other
uses, or for irrigation purposes, or for the draining and reclaiming of
lands, or for the floating of logs and lumber on streams not navigable, or
for solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution.
(6) roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes and
dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting or other reduction of
ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits
including minerals in solution; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water from mills, smelters or other
works for the reduction of ores, or from mines, quarries, coal mines or
mineral deposits including minerals in solution; mill dams; gas, oil or coal
pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface stratum or formation in any land for the underground storage of natural gas, and in connection therewith such other interests in property as may be required
adequately to examine, prepare, maintain, and operate such underground
natural gas storage facilities; and solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; also any occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal mines,
mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores,
or any place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter.
(7) byroads leading from highways to residences and farms.
(8) telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and
sites for electric light and power plants.
(9) sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than
ten families, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any
college or university.
(10) canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts and pipes for
supplying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose of generating and transmitting electricity for power, light or heat.
(11) cemeteries and public parks.
(12) pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids connected with the manufacture of beet sugar.
(13) sites for mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores and
necessary to the successful operation thereof, including the right to take
lands for the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, fumes and dust
therefrom, produced by the operation of such works; provided, that the
powers granted by this subdivision shall not be exercised in any county
where the population exceeds twenty thousand, or within one mile of the
limits of any city or incorporated town; nor unless the proposed
495
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condemner has the right to operate by purchase, option to purchase or
easement, at least seventy-five per cent in value ofland acreage owned by
persons or corporations situated within a radius of four miles from the
mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor beyond the
limits of said four-mile radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts, easements or agreements existing between the condemner and the owner of
land within said limit and providing for the operation of such mill,
smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor until an action shall
have been commenced to restrain the operation of such mill, smelter or
other works for the reduction of ores.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-1; L. 1957, ch. 174, § 1; 1963,
ch. 193,§ l; 1969,ch.258,§
1; 1973,ch.206,
§ 1; 1981, ch. 164, § 1.
Cross-References.
- Airports, §§ 2-2-5,
2-2-9, 2-2-10, 2-4-13.
Corporations, property and franchises subject to condemnation, Utah Const., Art. XII,
Sec. 11.
County service areas, § 17-29-10.2.
County water and sewer districts,§ 17-6-3.8.
•
Ditches, reservoirs, etc., § 73-1-6.
Drainage districts, § 19-1-8.
Due process of law, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec.
7.
Fire. protection districts, § 17-9-11.
Flood control, § 65-1-75.
Great Salt Lake, powers of Division of Parks
and Recreation, §§ 65-8-4, 65-8-5.
Highways, acquisition of rights-of-way,
§ 27-12-96.

Irrigation districts, Chapter 7 of Title 73.
Junkyard Control Act, § 27-12-137.9.
Mosquito abatement districts, § 26-14-8.
Municipal cemeteries, Chapter 5 of Title 8,
§ 10-8-62.
Municipal power, Utah Const., Art. XI, Sec.
5.
Municipal water supply, § 10-7-4.
Outdoor Advertising Act, § 27-12-136.11.
Private property not to be taken for public
use without just compensation, Utah Const.,
Art. I, Sec. 22.
Public works program, § 55-3-29.
Railroads, § 56-1-5.
§§ 11-19-23.9,
Redevelopment
agencies,
11-19-23.12.
Relocation Assistance Act, § 57-12-1 et seq.
State parks, § 63-11-17.
Taxation of land taken, §§ 59-5-3.5, 59-5-98.
Water conservancy districts, § 73-9-13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutional provisions.
Definitions.
Electric power systems.
Extra-territorial powers.
Irrigation.
Just compensation.
Mining.
Property not used for condemned purposes.
Radio-telephone service.
Railroads.
Roads and streets.
School property.
Sewer.
Statutory construction.
Taxes.
Telegraph companies.
Waterworks.
Constitutional provisions.
Injuries cognizable at common law or in equity are ordinarily not covered by constitu-

tional provisions authorizing compensation for
taking or damaging property. Lund v. Salt
Lake County, 58 Utah 546, 200 P. 510 (1921).
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Definitions.
The expression "private property," in Utah
Const., Art. I, Sec. 22, means all kinds of private property; the word "taken" embraces the
appropriation by any method; the phrase "just
compensation" includes any appropriate compensation, whether in money or benefits, providing the compensation is a just one-a fair
equivalent for the property parted with. Territory v. Daniels, 6 Utah 288, 22 P. 159, 5 L.R.A.
444 (1889).
Under Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 22, property
is taken for a "public use" when the taking is
for a use which will promote the public interest
and tend to develop the resources of the state.
Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371, 1 L.R.A.
(n.s.) 208, 101 Am. St. R. 953, 1 Ann. Cas. 300
(1903), afl'd, 198 U.S. 361, 25 S. Ct. 676, 49 L.
Ed. 1085 (1905).
Whether land will be devoted to a "public
use" is deter.mined by character of its use
rather than the extent of its use, so that if way
is opened for use by all, it is a public use
whether advantage be taken of the street by
few or many persons, and hence, contention in
eminent domain proceeding that use was not
public use because road would only serve three
or four farms was held without merit. Town of
Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343
(1933).
Any substantial interference with private
property which destroys or materially lessens
its value, or by which the owner's right to its
use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree
abridged or destroyed, constitutes a "taking"
within the meaning of Utah Const., Art. I, Sec.
22, notwithstanding the title and possession of
. the owner remain undisturbed. Stockdale v.
Rio Grande W. Ry., 28 Utah 201, 77 P. 849
(1904).
Total destruction of property or rendering
property valueless amounts to "taking" within
meaning of Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 22. Lund
v. Salt Lake County, 58 Utah 546, 200 P. 510
(1921).
A "taking," under Utah Const., Art. I, Sec.
22, may occur although there is no physical
trespass where the enjoyment of the property is
so impaired as to make it useless. State v.
Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 94 Utah 384, 78
P.2d 502 (1937).
Phrase "works for the reduction of ores" held
to include copper mining company's dump so
that tract of land which was natural outlet for
waters from dump could be condemned. Utah
Copper Co. v. Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc., 83
Utah 545, 31 P.2d 624 (1934), cert. denied, 295
U.S. 742, 55 S. Ct. 654, 79 L. Ed. 1688 (1935).
Electric power systems.
This section does not give municipalities the
authority to condemn an existing and operating electric power system public utility by emi-
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nent domain. CP Nat'l Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 638 P.2d 519 (Utah 1981).

Extra-territorial powers.
This section does not, by implication, confer
extra-territorial powers of condemnation upon
boards of education. Bertagnoli v. Baker, 117
Utah 348, 215 P.2d 626 (1950).
Irrigation.
Owner of farm could condemn right of way
through another's ditch for purpose of carrying
water to his land for irrigation purposes. Nash
v. Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371, 1 L.R.A. (n.s.)
208, 101 Am. St. R. 953, 1 Ann. Cas. 300
(1903), afl'd, 198 U.S. 361, 25 S. Ct. 676, 49 L.
Ed. 1085 (1905).
Under C.L. 1917, § 7330, canals and ditches
and other means of conveying water for beneficial purposes were declared to be public uses,
and the right of condemnation for such purposes was thereby allowed, without regard to
whether the right was sought by the public or a
private individual. Alcorn v. Reading, 66 Utah
509, 243 P. 922 (1926).
In action to adjudicate rights of appropriators from stream, held prior appropriator could
not be compelled to submit its reservoir to common storage of its own and subsequent appropriator's waters, and if no agreement could be
reached, only other alternative was action to
condemn under C.L. 1907, § 3590. Gunnison
Irrigation Co. v. Gunnison Highland Canal
Co., 52 Utah 347, 174 P. 852 (1918).
Just compensation.
Universal rule of damages in condemnation
proceedings is one of just compensation, and
condemnee is to be paid only so much as will
compensate him for damages to his property.
State v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P.2d 113
(1948).
Mining.
Mining is public use, in furtherance of which
right of exercise of eminent domain may be
applied with full force and effect. Monetaire
Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines
Co., 53 Utah 413, 174 P. 172 (1918).
One mining company could bring action
against another to condemn surface of tracts
for dumpage and storage thereon of overburden, waste, rock, ores, and other materials,
where property sought to be condemned was
not at such time a mining property and prospects of discovering minerals therein in paying
quantities were exceedingly doubtful. Freeman
Gulch Mining Co. v. Kennecott Copper Corp.,
119 F.2d 16 (10th Cir. 1941).
Copper mining company having easement to
dump residue on certain part of adjoining
claim and to remove same at any time is entitled to condemn adjoining property for excavation of tunnel and erection of pipe line to divert
waters from dump containing commercially
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valuable deposits of copper as a result of seepage through residue in dump, and where owner
of adjoining claim had been precipitating copper after water left dump, plaintiff was entitled
to interlocutory order giving it immediate possession under former § 104-61-10, pending
final determination of suit. Utah Copper Co. v.
Montana-Bingham Consol. Mining Co., 69
Utah 423, 255 P. 672 (1926).
Copper-bearing waters belonged to mining
company as long as they remained in dump,
but they became property of adjoining landowner upon entering latter's property, so that
mining company could not condemn tract of
land upon which such waters flowed after leaving dump for purpose of recapturing waters
and extracting copper therefrom, thus depriving adjoining landowner from doing likewise.
Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc.,
83 Utah 545, 31 P.2d 624 (1934), cert. denied,
295 U.S. 742, 55 S. Ct. 654, 79 L. Ed. 1688
(1935).
Trial court correctly granted owners of an
adjacent, unpatented placer mining claim right
of way over a road across defendants' mining
claim to be used jointly with them; however, a
definite designation of the right of way was
required and determination allowing owner of
dominant estate to relocate the right of way at
will was error. Jacobson v. Memmott, 11 Utah
2d 16, 354 P.2d 569 (1960).
Construction and operation of roads and
tramways for the development and working of
mines constitutes a public use within contemplation of Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 22. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. v. Strickley, 28 Utah
215, 78 P. 296, 1 L.R.A. (n.s) 976, 107 Am. St.
R. 711, 3 Ann. Cas. 1110 (1904), affd, 200 U.S.
527, 26 S. Ct. 301, 50 L. Ed. 581 (1906).
Roadways to developing mining deposits are
proper subjects for condemnation. Jacobson v.
Memmott, 11 Utah 2d 16, 354 P.2d 569 (1960).
Where tunnel was not used by owner and
possessor thereof to its full capacity, right to
joint use of tunnel could be condemned upon
proper compensation being made to owner.
Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall
Consol. Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 174 P. 172
(1918).
Property not used for condemned purposes.
After the fee has vested in the condemning
entity, the property does not revert to its former owner when it ceases to be used for the
purposes for which it was condemned. Olsen v.
Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist., 571
P.2d 1336 (Utah 1977).
Radio-telephone service.
Business of providing radio-telephone services constituted a public service, and the obvious public benefit or advantage constituted a

public use. Williams v. Hyrum Gibbons & Sons
Co., 602 P.2d 684 (Utah 1979).
Railroads.
A railroad company which has leased its entire properties and the operation thereof to a
lessee does not thereby lose its status as a common carrier, but is still charged with the responsibility of seeing that its duties as a common carrier performing a public service are
carried on in an efficient and satisfactory manner, and can therefore maintain an action for
condemnation. Oregon Short Line R.R. v.
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 120 Utah 621,
237 P.2d 829 (1951).
A railroad could not subject private property
in a city to the burden of being subjected to the
running of cars and engines over a switch laid
over adjoining property without proceeding under the law of eminent domain, as contemplated by Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 22.
Stockdale v. Rio Grande W. Ry., 28 Utah 201,
77 P. 849 (1904).
Roads and streets.
A county once having abandoned a street by
ordinance was not able to reestablish and rededicate the street by an amendatory resolution purporting to except that street from prior
abandonment, and was required to initiate
condemnation proceedings. Roy S. Ludlow Inv.
Co. v. Salt Lake County, 28 Utah 2d 139, 499
P.2d 283 (1972).
State Road Commission may acquire right of
way for state road purposes. Barnes v. Wade,
90 Utah 1, 58 P.2d 297 (1936).
School property.
School district can acquire property by eminent domain only if the taking is for school •
purposes. Olsen v. Board of Educ. of Granite
School Dist., 571 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1977).
Public school property should be taken and
compensated for the same as if it had been
taken from a private owner. State ex rel. Road
Comm'n v. Salt Lake City Pub. Bd. of Educ., 13
Utah 2d 56, 368 P.2d 468 (1962).
Sewer.
Where a special improvement district had
condemned a right of way for a sewer line
across defendants' tract of unimproved land,
and defendants sought a further award for loss
of water on their property but declined to offer
any proof that the market value of the property
was less after the installation of the sewer
than it was before, the trial court properly entered a summary judgment of one dollar nominal damages for the defendant. Salt Lake
County Cottonwood San. Dist. v. Toone, 11
Utah 2d 232, 357 P.2d 486 (1960).
Statutory construction.
Statute must be construed and applied to
any particular case with as much liberality as
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its language will permit in order to carry out
purpose which legislative power had in mind,
which was to declare mining generally a public
use in aid of which power of eminent domain
may be invoked. Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen
Hayes Estate, Inc., 83 Utah 545, 31 P.2d 624
(1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 742, 55 S. Ct. 654,
79 L. Ed. 1688 (1935).
Statute granting right of eminent domain for
particular purpose must be liberally construed
in furtherance of such purpose. Freeman Gulch
Mining Co. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 119
F.2d 16 (10th Cir. 1941).
Taxes.
Where property is taken for public purpose
through taxation in excess of benefits conferred, such action is unconstitutional and
void. Bothwell v. Salt Lake County Drainage
Dist. No. 2, 85 Utah 415, 39 P.2d 737 (1935).
Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 22 has no application to and does not limit state's power of taxation. Kimball v. City of Grantsville, 19 Utah
368, 57 P. 1, 45 L.R.A. 628 (1899).
Telegraph companies.
Fact that telegraph company of another
state was interested in local company held not
to have affected latter's right to maintain pro-

78-34-2

ceedings to condemn right of way under R.S.
1898, § 3588. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon
S.L.R.R., 23 Utah 474, 65 P. 735, 90 Am. St. R.
705 (1901).
Waterworks.
Where, by contract between a city and another, the latter agreed to build and maintain
a waterworks system for supplying water to
the city, and such party, relying on the terms
of the contract and the good faith of the city,
constructed, at a cost of many thousands of dollars, a satisfactory water system, a decree holding the contract void because of any informality in its execution, and that the city was the
owner of the waterworks system, and was entitled to the rents which had been collected,
would have amounted to a violation of Utah
Const., Art. I, Sec. 22. Ogden City v. Bear Lake
& River Waterworks & Irrigation Co., 28 Utah
25, 76 P. 1069 (1904).
By the terms of this section and § 10-7-4,
town had authority to condemn water system
for use of its inhabitants even though property
belonged to company which was furnishing
public service. North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph
Water & Irrigation Co., 118 Utah 600, 223
P.2d 577 (1950).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - State Condemnation
Proceedings and the Loss of Saleable Water
Assets, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 92.
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders: Defining the Parameters of Limitless Power, 1983
Utah L. Rev. 397.
Eminent Domain and the Federal Oil and
Gas Lessee - Lessee's Standing to Condemn a
Right-of-Way, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 391.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain § 40 et seq.
C.J.S. - 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 29
et seq.
A.L.R. - Right to condemn property in excess of needs for particular public purpose, 6
A.L.R.3d 297.
Power to condemn property or interest
therein to replace other property taken for public use, 20 A.L.R.3d 862.
Power of eminent domain as between state
and subdivision or agency thereof, or as be-
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tween different subdivisions or agencies themselves, 35 A.L.R.3d 1293.
Propriety of court's consideration of ecological effects of proposed project in determining
right of condemnation, 47 A.L.R.3d 1267.
Compensation for diminution in value of the
remainder of property resulting from taking or
use of adjoining land of others for the same
undertaking, 59 A.L.R.3d 488.
Salting for snow removal as taking or damaging abutting property for eminent domain
purposes, 64 A.L.R.3d 1239.
Inverse condemnation state court class actions, 49 A.L.R.4th 618.
Right of out-of-state property owner to commence in, or remove to, federal court action
involving taking of property by state, local government or agency thereof, 4 A.L.R. Fed. 236.
Key Numbers. - Eminent Domain ,ga, 12 et
seq.

Estates and rights that may be taken.

The following is a classification of the estates and rights in lands subject to
be taken for public use:
(1) a fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds or for
permanent buildings, for reservoirs and dams and permanent flooding
occasioned thereby, or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit of
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debris or tailing~ of a mine, mill, smelter or other place for the reduction
of ores, or for solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery
of minerals in solution; provided that where surface ground is underlaid
with minerals, coal or other deposits sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, only a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface ground
over such deposits.
(2) an easement, when taken for any other use.
(3) the right of entry upon, and occupation of lands, with the right to
take therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees and timber as may be
necessary for some public use.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-2; L. 1969, ch. 258, § [2].
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Easements.
-Access, light, and air.
-Gas pipe line.
-Irrigation
canal.
-Superimposition.

Easements.
-Access,
light, and air.
Although an abutting property owner has
easement rights of access, light, and air, he is
not entitled to recovery from the state for damages from the erection of structures within the
public right of way which adversely affect the
convenience of access to his property. Bailey
Serv. & Supply Corp. v. State ex rel. Road
Comm'n, 533 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975).
-Gas pipe line.
In proceeding to condemn easement in land
for laying of gas pipe line, taking of easement
was held not to constitute taking of fee.

Wasatch Gas Co. v. Bouwhuis, 82 Utah 573, 26
P.2d 548 (1933).

-Irrigation canal.
Right to run water through defendants' irrigation canal might be condemned, although
defendants had only easement. Whiterocks Irrigation Co. v. Mooseman, 45 Utah 79, 141 P.
459 (1914).
-Superimposition.
One easement may be superimposed on another
easement
through
condemnation.
Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall
Consol. Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 174 P. 172
(1918).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain § 73 et seq.
C.J.S. - 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 65
et seq.
A.L.R. - Restrictive covenant or right to
enforcement thereof as a compensable property
right, 4 A.L.R.3d 1137.

Rights and liabilities of parties to executory
contract for sale of land taken by eminent domain, 27 A.L.R.3d 572.
Key Numbers. - Eminent Domain eo 44 et
seq.
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78-34-3. Private property which may be taken.
The private property which may be taken under this chapter includes:
(1) all real property belonging to any person.
(2) lands belonging to the state, or to any county, city or incorporated
town, not appropriated to some public use.
(3) property appropriated to public use; provided, that such property
shall not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than that to
which it has been already appropriated.
{4) franchises for toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, and all other franchises; provided, that such franchises shall not be taken unless for free
highways, railroads, or other more necessary public use.
(5) All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in § 78-34-1
hereof, and any and all structures and improvements thereon, and the
lands held or used in connection therewith, shall be subject to be connected with, crossed or intersected by any other right of way or improvement or structure thereon; they shall also be subject to a limited use in
common with the owners thereof, when necessary; but such uses of crossings, intersections and connections shall be made in the manner most
compatible with the greatest public benefit and the least private injury.
(6) All classes of private property not enumerated may be taken for
public use when such taking is authorized by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § I; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-3.
Cross-References. - Property and fran-

chises of private corporations subject to eminent domain, Utah Const., Art. XII, Sec.-11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Federal lands.
Joint or use in common.
More necessary public use.
Property appropriated to public use.
Railroad rights of way.

Federal lands.
Under Utah Const., Art. III, Sec. 2, and section 3 of Enabling Act, by which the people
forever disclaimed all right and title to unappropriated public lands lying within boundaries thereof, public lands are not subject to
state power of eminent domain either directly
or indirectly, without consent of United States.
Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 230
F. 328, 337, 4 A.L.R. 535 (8th Cir. 1915).
Joint or use in common.
Proceeding under C.L. 1907, § 1288x 22 by
city against irrigation company to obtain right
to enlarge irrigating canal owned by defendant
so as to convey water from river for use of its
inhabitants was controlled by principles involved in exercise of right of eminent domain.
Salt Lake City v. East Jordan Irrigation Co.,
40 Utah 126, 121 P. 592 (1911).

Where tunnel was not used by owner and
possessor thereof to its full capacity, right to
joint use of tunnel could be condemned upon
proper compensation being made to owner.
Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall
Consol. Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 174 P. 172
(1918).

More necessary public use.
Proceeding by power company to obtain
right to connect flume with city's canal for purpose of discharging water into it was not suit to
condemn land belonging to city as it owned
only easement over land, and hence it was not
necessary to show that use by power company
was more necessary public use than that by
city. Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co. v.
Salt Lake City, 25 Utah 441, 71 P. 1067 (1903).
Generally, property which is being held for
or devoted to public use by one person may not
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be taken by another to be used for same purpose and in the same manner. Utah Copper Co.
v. Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc., 83 Utah 545, 31
P.2d 624 (1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 742, 55
S. Ct. 654, 79 L. Ed. 1688 (1935).

Property appropriated to public use.
Property devoted to one public use may, under general statutory authority, be taken for
another public use, where taking will not materially impair or interfere with, 6r is not inconsistent with, use already existing. Freeman
Gulch Mining Co. v. Kennecott Copper Corp.,
119 F.2d 16 (10th Cir. 1941).
Railroad rights of way.
Sufficient ground for a tipple site may be
condemned, but a coal company cannot con-

demn any portion of a right of way, used for
railroad purposes and granted by Congress, for
a tipple site, regardless of how convenient that
would be, and even though it would indirectly
benefit the public. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 50 Utah 395, 168 P. 86
(1917).
Land, which is part of railroad's right of way
but is not used for any purpose and is not essential to enjoyment of railroad's franchise aRd
property, may be appropriated to use of duly
incorporated telegraph company for purpose of
constructing and maintaining its lines, since
such appropriation is for more necessary public
use. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon S.L.R.R.,
23 Utah 474, 65 P. 735, 90 Am. St. R. 705
(1901).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain § 73 et seq.
C.J.S. - 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 65
et seq.
A.L.R. - Right to condemn property in ex-

78-34-4.

Conditions

cess of needs for a particular public purpose, 6
A.L.R.3d 297.
Loss of liquor license as compensable in condemnation proceeding, 56 A.L.R.3d 581.
Key Numbers. - Eminent Domain ea. 45,
48 to 52.

precedent

to taking.

Before property can be taken it must appear:
(1) that the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law;
(2) that the taking is necessary to such use;
(3) that construction and use of all property sought to be condemned
will commence within a reasonable time as determined by the court, after
the initiation of proceedings under this chapter; and
(4) if already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to
which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-4; L. 1981, ch. 161, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

More necessary public use.
-Condemnation
of easement.
Necessity of taking.
-Duty of court.

More necessary public use.
-Condemnation
of easement.
Proceeding by power company to obtain
right to connect flume with city's canal for purpose of discharging water into it was not suit to
condemn land belonging to city as it owned
only easement over land, and hence it was not

necessary to show that use by power company
was more necessary public use than that by
city. Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co. v.•
Salt Lake City, 25 Utah 441, 71 P. 1067 (1903).
Necessity of taking.
-Duty of court.
The court has the duty of determining the
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necessity of the taking. Salt Lake County v.
Ramoselli, 567 P.2d 182 (Utah 1977).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Note, Urban Planning and Development - Race and Poverty Past, Present and Future, 1971 Utah L. Rev.
46.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain § 379.
C.J.S. - 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 29.

78-34-5.

A.L.R. - Right to condemn property in excess of needs for particular public purpose, 6
A.L.R.3d 297.
Propriety of court's consideration of ecological effects of proposed project in determining
right of condemnation, 47 A.L.R.3d 1267.
Key Numbers. - Eminent Domain ®=> 13.

Right of entry for survey and location.

In all cases where land is required for public use, the person, or his agent, in
charge of such use may survey and locate the same; but it must be located in
the manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good and
the least private injury, and subject to the provisions of this chapter. The
person, or his agent, in charge of such public use may enter upon the land and
make examinations, surveys and maps thereof, and such entry shall constitute no cause of action in favor of the owners of the lands, except for actual
damage to the land and improvements thereon caused by such entry, which is
not repaired on or before the date the examinations and surveys are completed.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-5; L. 1967, ch. 220, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain § 168.
C.J.S. - 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 226.

78-34-6.

Complaint -

A.L.R. - Right to enter land for preliminary survey or examination, 29 A.L.R.3d 1104.
Key Numbers. - Eminent Domain ®=> 186.

Contents.

The complaint must contain:
(1) the name of the corporation, association, commission or person in
charge of the public use for which the property is sought, who must be
styled plaintiff.
(2) the names of all owners and claimants of the property, if known, or
a statement that they are unknown, who must be styled defendants.
(3) a statement of the right of the plaintiff.
(4) if a right of way is sought, the complaint must show its location,
general route and termini, and must be accompanied by a map thereof, so
far as the same is involved in the action or proceeding.
(5) a description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether
the same includes the whole or only part of an entire parcel or tract. All
parcels lying in the county and required for the same public use may be
included in the same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, but the court may consolidate or separate them to suit the convenience of parties.
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-6.

General
Cross-References.
pleading, Rule 8, U.R.C.P.

rules

of

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Allegations.
-Acquisition
of title.
-Jurisdiction.
--Waiver
of defects.
Amendments.
-After order entered.
Counterclaim to action for damages.
Description of land.
-Sufficiency.
uowner."
-Homesteader.

Allegations.
certain land condemned for public use, or that
/ such_land is necessa? for such use, gives him
-Acquisition
of title.
no nght of entry pr10r to condemnation, and
Condemner may allege that it acquired title
condemnation cannot be had by way of counsubsequent to institution of the condemnation
action. Ketchum Coal Co. v. District Court, 48 terclaim in action against him for damages for,
and to restrain, his trespassing on land. PeterUtah 342, 159 P. 737, 4 A.L.R. 619 (1916).
son v. Bean, 22 Utah 43, 61 P. 213 (1900).
-Jurisdiction.
Description of land.
--Waiver
of defects.
In proceedings to condemn land, where no -Sufficiency.
demurrer was interposed to complaint and no
Where town sought to condemn certain land
objection respecting its sufficiency made, either before or during trial, defect that com- burdened with an easement and additional adjoining lands and neither in complaint or eviplaint failed to state that attempted condemnadence was adjoining land described in a mantion proceedings were authorized as required
ner that jury would know precise amount of
by C.L. 1907, § 206x 2, being jurisdictional,
land taken from each owner, land sought to be
was not waived. Town of Tremonton v. Johntaken was not sufficiently described. Town of
ston, 49 Utah 307, 164 P. 190 (1917).
Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343
Amendments.
(1933).
-After order entered.
"Owner."
In eminent domain proceeding after order
giving full and exclusive possession, pending
-Homesteader.
action, of certain defined tracts, parts of strip
Person who had filed homestead entry on
sought to be condemned for permanent railtract of land, and thereafter relinquished and
road right of way, and entry upon and improvement of such tracts, and after defendant in for- canceled the entry pursuant to a contract with
state land board, by which they agreed to semer and in present trial had submitted all its
evidence on theory that condemner would ex- lect the lands under grant to the state from the
clude it from tracts, condemner had no right to United States, to preserve the entryman's
amend as matter of course, so as to permit de- rights, and to sell the land to him at a certain
price, all of which was done, the entryman
fendant to have joint possession of part of tract.
Bingham & G. Ry. v. North Utah Mining Co., thereafter remaining in possession of and
49 Utah 125, 162 P. 65 (1916).
claiming the land, was an "owner" within
meaning ofR.S. 1898, § 3594. Brigham City v.
Counterclaim to action for damages.
Chase, 30 Utah 410, 85 P. 436 (1906).
Mere fact that person contemplates having
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain § 395.
C.J.S. - 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 253.
A.L.R. - What constitutes abandonment of

78-34-7.

eminent domain proceeding so as to charge
condemner with liability for condemnee's expenses or the like, 68 A.L.R.3d 610.
Key Numbers. - Eminent Domain
191.

Who may appear and defend.

All persons in occupation of, or having or claiming an interest in, any of the
property described in the complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof,
though not named, may appear, plead and defend, each in respect to his own
property or interest, or that claimed by him, in the same manner as if named
in the complaint.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Interest in property.
-Assignor of right to land.
-Owner of adjoining land.
-Taxpayers.
-Tax sale purchaser.
Jurisdiction.
-Absence of claimants.
-Absence of land owner.

Interest in property.
-Assignor
of right to land.
In condemnation proceeding by city against
one in possession ofland under contract to purchase from state, title to which was in United
States, where pending the proceedings defendant in possession assigned has right in land to
corporation of which he was president and director, which received patent therefor from
state and was afterwards made party to proceedings, held original defendant had interest
in land when proceedings were commenced
which was subject to condemnation and was
same interest which passed to defendant corporation and ripened into title relating back to
contract of sale by state. Brigham City v. Rich.,
34 Utah 130, 97 P. 220 (1908), appeal dismissed, 220 U.S. 603, 31 S. Ct. 716, 55 L. Ed.
604 (1911).
-Owner of adjoining land.
Where owner of land adjoining that to be
condemned filed claim asserting that his land
would suffer damages if the land were condemned, there was not a vested interest in the
land such as would allow damages to be given.
The fact that both parcels of land were being
planned for subdivisions and that the respec-

tive owners had agreed that there would be
restrictive covenants on the land, but in fact
there were no convenants between the owner of
the condemned land and the owner of the adjoining land fell short of establishing a vested
interest. State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 31, 286
P.2d 785 (1955).

-Taxpayers.
This section does not permit persons interested only as taxpayers to intervene. Town of
Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343
(1933).
-Tax sale purchaser.
Under this section, purchaser of property at
tax sale who has received certificate of sale
may be made a party to the proceeding, or may
voluntarily _intervene and have his lien established and the amount thereof ascertained. Oregon Short Line R.R. v. Hallock, 41 Utah 378,
126 P. 394 (1912).
Jurisdiction.
-Absence
of claimants.
Under this section, it is not
prerequisite that claimant of
made a party in the complaint
pear and defend such interest;
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merely be a nullity as to those omitted. Brigham City v. Chase, 30 Utah 410, 85 P. 436
(1906).

-Absence
of land owner.
Right to run water through defendant's irri-

gation canal may be condemned, though defendants had only easement, and owners of land
were not parties to proceeding. Whiterocks Irrigation Co. v. Mooseman, 45 Utah 79, 141 P.
459 (1914).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 236.
Key Numbers. - Eminent Domain <S=>177.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain §§ 391, 392.

78-34-8.

Powers of court or judge.

The court or judge thereof shall have /power:
(1) to hear and determine all advers~. or conflicting claims to the property sought to be condemned, and to the damages therefor, and
(2) to determine the respective rights of different parties seeking condemnation of the same property.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-8; L. 1981, ch. 161, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Jury trial.
-Question of title.
Municipal ordinance.
-Necessity.

Jury trial.
-Question of title.
A party is not deprived of his right to a jury
trial because the question of title is tried in the
original proceeding rather than in a separate
action or proceeding. If the question respecting
title is equitable, no party is, as a matter of
right, entitled to a jury trial, and, if the question is purely legal, then all questions, whether
with regard to the title or the damages, may be
tried and submitted at the same time to the
jury that is impanelled in the case. Ketchum

Coal Co. v. District Court, 48 Utah 342, 159 P.
737, 4 A.L.R. 619 (1916).

Municipal ordinance.
-Necessity.
Where there was evidence of need for immediate occupancy in condemnation proceedings
to build public highway, and city had already
laid out and established street, city was exercising its right of eminent domain and was not
required to adopt specific ordinance in order to
obtain land. Bountiful v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236
(Utah 1975).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain § 408.
C.J.S. - 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 267
et seq.

Key Numbers.
198(1).
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Occupancy of premises pending action - Deposit
paid into court - Procedure for payment of compensation.

The plaintiff may move the court or a judge thereof, at any time after the
commencement of suit, on notice to the defendant, if he is a resident of the
state, or has appeared by attorney in the action, otherwise by serving a notice
directed to him on the clerk of the court, for an order permitting the plaintiff
to ocyupy the premises sought to be condemned pending the action, including
appeal, and to do such work thereon as may be required. The court or a judge
ther~~f shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise of the value of the premises
sought to be condemned and of the damages which will accrue from the condemnation, and of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall
grant or refuse the motion according to the equity of the case and the relative
damages which may accrue to the parties. If the motion is granted, the court
or judge shall enter its order requiring the plaintiff as a condition precedent to
occupancy to file with the clerk of the court a sum equivalent to at least 75/%
of the condemning authority's appraised valuation of the property sought to
be condemned. The amount thus fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion
only, and shall not be admissible in evidence on final hearing. The rights of
the just compensation for the land so taken or damaged shall vest in the
parties entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained and
awarded as provided in § 78-34-10 and established by judgment therein, and
the said judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation awarded,
interest at the rate of 8/% per annum on the amount finally awarded as the
value of the property and damages, from the date of taking actual possession
thereof by the plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date
of judgment; but interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have
been paid into court. Upon the application of the parties in interest, the court
shall order the money deposited in the court be paid forthwith for or on account of the just compensation to be awarded in the proceeding. A payment to
a defendant as aforesaid shall be held to be an abandonment by such defendant of all defenses excepting his claim for greater compensation. If the compensation finally awarded in respect of such lands, or any parcel thereof, shall
exceed the amount of the money so received the court shall enter judgment
against the plaintiff for the amount of the deficiency. If the amount of money
so received by the defendant is greater than the amount finally awarded, the
court shall enter judgment against the defendant for the amount of the excess.
Upon the filing of the petition for immediate occupancy the court shall fix the
time within which, and the terms upon which, the parties in possession shall
be required to surrender possession to the plaintiff. The court shall make such
orders in respect to encumbrances, liens, rents, assessments, insurance and
other charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-9; L. 1967, ch. 220, § 1.

Cross-References. - Officers before whom
affidavits may be taken, § 78-26-5.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
-Payment
of interest.
Challenge to state's right to condemn.
Deposit paid into court.
-Notice.
--Duty
of condemner.
-Payment
to one of several condemne~.
-Right to hearing.
--Assignee
of vendee.
Discretion of court.
-Required showing by plaintiff.
Immediate occupancy denied.
-Condemnation
of railroad.
-Outdoor advertising.
Interest.
-Actual possession.
-Determination
of damages.
-Entry upon property.
-Lack of proper notice of fund.
-Rate.
--Pre-1967.
Interlocutory character of order.
Recovery of damages from condemnor.
-Following dismissal of proceedings.
Suit to enjoin construction by state.
-Immunity.

Constitutionality.
Revised Statutes 1898, § 3597, which was
akin to this section, was not invalid under
Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 22 on theory that permitting occupation upon posting of a bond
pending completion of condemnation proceedings constituted a taking without compensation, a bond not being compensation; constitution did not require that compensation precede
occupation. Salt Lake City Water & Elec.
Power Co. v. Salt Lake City, 24 Utah 282, 67 P.
791 (1902).
-Payment
of interest.
This section's provision that interest shall be
paid only from the time of actual possession by
the condemnor does not violate the constitutional mandate that private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation. City of South Ogden v.
Fujiki, 621 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1980).
Challenge to state's right to condemn.
Property owners preserved their right to
challenge state's right to condemn their property by leaving on deposit with court those
funds which had been deposited pursuant to
order of immediate occupancy. Utah State Rd.
Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984)
(two justices concurring, one justice concurring
separately, and two justices dissenting).
Since an order of immediate occupancy only

requires prima facie proof of right to condemn,
that order is not a final adjudication on merits;
state's right to condemn, if challenged, can
finally be determined only after a trial on
merits, not at a hearing on motion for immediate occupancy. Utah State Rd. Comm'n v.
Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984) (two justices
concurring, one justice concurring separately,
and two justices dissenting).

Deposit paid into court.
-Notice.
--Duty
of condemner.
This section does not provide that any formal
notification of the deposit be made to the defendant, but it does specify that no interest shall
be allowed on the amount paid into court;
condemner fully complied with the statute by
making the deposit into court and had no duty
of formal notification to the condemnees. State
ex rel. Road Comm'n v. Rohan, 28 Utah 2d 375,
503 P.2d 141 (1972).
-Payment
to one of several condemnees.
If court orders that money paid in by
condemner be paid over to any condemnee, it
should be done in such manner as to make it
clear that payment by a condemner and acceptance by one condemnee does not adversely affect the right of any other condemnee to assert
any rights or defenses he may have. Jelco, Inc.
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v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 29 Utah 2d 472,
511 P.2d 739 (1973).

-Right

to hearing.

--Assignee
of vendee.
Assignee of vendee of land subject to condemnation proceedings was entitled to hearing
regarding the respective rights of the vendor
and vendee to the fund which had been paid
into court by condemner. Jelco, Inc. v. Third
Judicial Dist. Court, 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d
7.39 (1973).
Discretion of court.
The granting of a motion for immediate occupancy is directed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, reversible only because of obvious
abuse thereof. State v. Denver & Rio Grande
W. R.R., 8 Utah 2d 236, 332 P.2d 926 (1958).
-Required
showing by plaintiff.
Power to gtant immediate occupancy of
premises to plaintiff hereunder, pending final
determination of condemnation proceeding, is
largely discretionary; but in exercise of such
discretion, court may well require plaintiff to
make showing not only as to necessity for
speedy occupation, but also a prima facie showing of his right to condemn, if that is controverted. Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham
Consol. Mining Co., 69 Utah 423, 255 P. 672
(1926).
Immediate occupancy

denied.

-Condemnation
of railroad.
In proceeding by state to condemn part of a
railroad, motion for immediate occupancy was
properly denied, even though facts adduced at
an ex parte hearing on the motion indicated
little doubt that the state's use would serve a
higher and better purpose, since the railroad
made an issue of the matter and should be allowed the adduction of competent evidence at a
regular trial. State v. Denver & Rio Grande W.
R.R., 8 Utah 2d 236, 332 P.2d 926 (1958).
-Outdoor advertising.
Department of transportation which brought
action to condemn certain outdoor advertising
signs pursuant to Highway Beautification Act
did not establish entitlement to immediate occupancy; the right to condemn did not flow automatically into a right of immediate occupancy; it was necessary to meet the requisites
of this section. Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Hatch,
613 P.2d 764 (Utah 1980).
Interest.
-Actual possession.
Interest awarded under this section is to be
paid from the date of actual possession by the
condemnor; condemnor was not in actual possession of the land by reason of prayer in its
complaint requesting immediate occupancy

78-34-9

and the landowners' answers which admitted
all allegations of the complaint, and interest
was due from the date of the judgment and not
the date of the answers, where the condemnor
did not move for immediate occupancy and no
order therefore was entered, and condemnor
did not enter upon land nor begin construction
upon the land prior to the date judgment was
entered. City of South Ogden v. Fujiki, 621
P.2d 1254 (Utah 1980).

-Determination
of damages.
Until amount of damages sustained by condemnee was determined, there was no judgment which would bear interest within meaning of§ 15-1-4; order of immediate occupancy
was nothing more than an interlocutory order,
and was not a judgment which would bear interest. State v. Danielson, 122 Utah 220, 247
P.2d 900 (1952) (decided prior to 1967 amendment).
-Entry upon property.
Property owner was entitled to interest at
8% per annum as a matter of law on the damage awarded him as a result of a taking of an
easement by a sanitary district, with such interest running from the date the sanitary district entered upon his property. Siegel v. Salt
Lake County Cottonwood San. Dist., 655 P.2d
662 (Utah 1982).
-Lack of proper notice of fund.
Where county failed to comply with court order requiring notification to property owners of
amount of condemned land owned by each, and
percentage in relation to total land condemned,
thus rendering it impossible for property
owners to withdraw money from the immediate-occupancy fund established by county, the
property owners were entitled to interest on
the money so held, since to deny interest would
penalize the property owners for the county's
dereliction of duty. Utah County v. Brown, 672
P.2d 83 (Utah 1983).
-Rate.
--Pre-1967.
Prior to 1967 amendment, statutes on eminent domain were silent as to rate of interest
allowed condemnee, and interest was to be allowed at the legal rate (6% at the time of this
decision). State v. Danielson, 122 Utah 220,
247 P.2d 900 (1952).
Interlocutory character of order.
Order granting immediate possession to
plaintiff in condemnation proceeding as herein
provided is interlocutory and not appealable.
Plaintiff may be required to make prima facie
showing of right to condemn and necessity for
speedy occupation, and before final determination defendant may adduce evidence controverting interlocutory order, which is in no wise
res judicata of issues. Utah Copper Co. v. Mon-
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tana-Bingham Consol. Mining Co., 69 Utah
423, 255 P. 672 (1926).

nee in independent action. Moyle v. Salt Lake
City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P.2d 882 (1947).

Recovery of damages from condemnor.
Former§ 104-61-10 contemplated that damages might flow from occupancy of premises
and that if so, plaintiff should reimburse defendant. North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water &
Irrigation Co., 118 Utah 600, 223 P.2d 577
(1950).

Suit to enjoin construction by state.

-Following
dismissal of proceedings.
City which obtained immediate possession of
water rights but dismissed condemnation proceeding before adjudication of value of property
was liable for all damages caused by the taking
and holding of possession; loss of rents and deprivation of use of property were among the
losses which could be recovered by the condem-

-Immunity.
Suit to enjoin state road commissioners, as
individual members, and a contractor from
proceeding with any work on a viaduct to be
constructed in front of plaintiffs property until
plaintiff had been paid appropriate money
damages was unsuccessful; commissioners
were engaged in the performance of their duties in the exercise of the police power of the
state to better provide for the orderly flow of
traffic and were thus given the same immunity
from suit as is given to the state or to its commissions. Anderson Inv. Corp. v. State, 28
Utah 2d 379, 503 P.2d 144 (1972).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. -The Condemnor's Liability for Damages Arising Through Instituting, Litigating, or Abandoning Eminent Domain Proceedings, 1967 Utah L. Rev. 548.

78-34-10.

Compensation

C.J.S. - 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 221.
Key Numbers. - Eminent Domain~ 187.

and damages -

How assessed.

The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered
by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and
assess:
(1) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate
estate or interest therein; and if it consists of different parcels, the value
of each parcel and of each estate or interest therein shall be separately
assessed.
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to
be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.
(3) if the property, though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by
the construction of the proposed improvement, the amount of such damages.
(4) separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and
each estate or interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the construction of the improvement proposed by the plaintiff. If the benefit shall be
equal to the damages assessed under Subdivision (2) of this section, the
owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of
the portion taken; but if the benefit shall be less than the damages so
assessed, the former shall be deducted from the latter, and the remainder
shall be the only damages allowed in addition to the value of the portion
taken.
(5) As far as practicable compensation must be assessed for each source
of damages separately.
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-10.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Access.
Adverse possessors.
Aerial easement.
Burden of proof.
Consequential or severance damages.
Definitions.
Evidence.
Grades of streets and sidewalks.
How determined.
Injunction.
Instructions.
Pipelines.
Railroads.
School property.
Types or elements of damages.
Verdict.
Water rights.
Access.
Rights of access, light and air are easements
appurtenant to land abutting on a street, and
may not be taken or impaired without just
compensation; testimony as to severance damages (impairment of light, air and view, invasion of privacy and deprivation of access) from
construction of viaduct within right of way was
properly admitted. Utah State Rd. Comm'n v.
Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974).
In action condemning land for use in widening and improving an arterial highway, where
value of right of access to highway appurtenant to the property taken was included in the
award for the land, the property owners had no
claim for additional damages for loss of access
to the highway from their remaining property.
The relationship of the remaining property to
the highway was the same as if a new roadway
had been constructed adjacent to the property.
Utah Rd. Comm'n v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305,
383 P.2d 917 (1963).
Action by abutting owner of property against
railroad to recover damages to property by reason of construction and operation of railroad in
public street in front of his property by which
ingress and egress to and from property was
impeded, and use was otherwise directly affected, came within Utah Const., Art. I, Sec.
22; measure of damages was amount that property had depreciated in market value. Morris
v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 36 Utah 14, 102 P.
629 (1909).
Construction of viaduct upon public right of
way, allegedly interfering with adjacent landowner's right of access by making it impossible

to use entire width of street to maneuver large
trucks into its warehouse, was not a "taking"
of property for which state was liable. Bailey
Serv. & Supply Corp. v. State ex rel. Road
Comm'n, 533 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975).
Adverse possessors.
Severance damage to nonowned land held by
peaceable possession was improperly allowed
defendants since they did not own the fee and
their possession had not thereby been disturbed. State ex rel. Road Comm'n v. LeSourd,
24 Utah 2d 383, 472 P.2d 939 (1970).
Aerial easement.
Landowner over whose property city condemned an aerial easement was entitled not
only to compensation for diminution in value of
the property directly affected, but severance
damages as well. Provo City Corp. v. Knudsen,
558 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977).
Burden of proof.
In proceeding to take private property for
public use, burden is on owner of property to
prove amount of his damages. Tanner v. Provo
Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 105,
121 P. 584 (1911), affd, 239 U.S. 323, 36 S. Ct.
101, 60 L. Ed. 307 (1915).
Consequential or severance damages.
Where severance damage is sought to a remaining tract on theory that the taking has
depreciated the fair market value of that tract,
there must be proof that no comparable land is
available in the area of the condemned land.
State v. Cooperative Sec. Corp. of Church of
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Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 122 Ut~h
134, 247 P.2d 269 (1952).
Where no severance damages were awarded
in the taking of an easement for construction of
a sewer, trial court erred in deducting the enhancement in value of the remaining untaken
property as a result of the construction of the
sewer from the amount of the damages
awarded to property owner for the taking of
the easement. Siegel v. Salt Lake County
Cottonwood San. Dist., 655 P.2d 662 (Utah
1982).
Severance damages suffered by remainder
property may not be offset by benefits conferred as a result of condemnation where there
is no evidence as to such benefits. Utah Dep't of
Transp. v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984).
Evidence as to drainage damages to remainder property which would be caused by construction of a highway and culvert system on
the condemned parcel was admissible as bearing on severance damages. Utah Dep't of
Transp. v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984).
In proceeding to condemn strip of land on
which to erect poles bearing wires heavily
charged with electricity, if presence of wires
would expose to danger persons and livestock
on land of defendant not taken, and thus depreciate market value of such land, defendant was
entitled to show such fact. Telluride Power Co.
v. Bruneau, 41 Utah 4, 125 P. 399, 1915A Ann.
Cas. 1251 (1912).
Proximity and severance damages, absent a
showing of complete similarity, are dependent
on the particular facts and circumstances of
each case, so what the state paid as such to a
neighbor would be inadmissible to show the
severance and proximity damages to the property being condemned. State ex rel. Rd.
Comm'n v. Christensen, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371
P.2d 552 (1962).
Where lands used by owners for sheep and
lamb grazing were so located and intermingled
that a grazing use meant an intermingled use
of all the lands, including the lands from which
a railroad company took sand and gravel, the
activities of the company affected all the
owners' lands and not just the operations on
the particular acreages from which sand and
gravel was taken and, where the damages were
of a special kind to the grazing use to which
the lands were fitted, even though there had
been no actual taking of any lands, the owners
were entitled to just compensation. Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 352 P.2d
693 (1960).
Condemnee was entitled to severance damages where his roadway was rendered useless
for vehicular traffic as result of highway condemnation. State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v.
Hooper, 24 Utah 2d 249, 469 P.2d 1019 (1970).
In highway condemnation case, it is not

error to permit testimony as to reconstruction
costs without proof that the diminution in
value of property not taken would be greater
than the cost of reconstruction. State Rd.
Comm'n v. Fox, 30 Utah 2d 194, 515 P.2d 450
(1973).
In action to condemn lands for a canal where
the part of land not taken might be damaged
by loss of sub-irrigation rights, trial court
should retain jurisdiction until completion of
canal and thereafter take evidence to determine damages, if any. Weber Basin Water
Conservancy Dist. v. Gailey, 5 Utah 2d 385,
303 P.2d 271 (1956), reversed, 8 Utah 2d 55,
328 P.2d 175 (1958).
In proceeding to condemn easement in land
for laying of gas pipeline, admissibility of evidence by landowners of market value per acre
of the respective tracts without easement and
depreciation of land affected but not taken was
proper. Wasatch Gas Co. v. Bouwhuis, 82 Utah
573, 26 P.2d 548 (1933).
The compensation to which an owner is entitled for severance damages is the difference in
the fair market value of his property before
and after the taking. State v. Cooperative Sec.
Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints, 122 Utah 134, 247 P.2d 269 (1952).
Measure of severance damages to the remainder is difference between fair cash market
value before and after the taking. Utah Dep't
of Transp. v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481 (Utah
1979).
The rules as to severance damages and damages to land not taken have been applied to
condemnation of uncultivated pasture land.
The right to recover such damages must be
predicated upon some· physical injury to lands
not condemned which would depreciate the
market value of the property remaining. Provo
River Water Users' Ass'n v. Carlson, 103 Utah
93, 133 P.2d 777 (1943).
Damages to land, by the construction of a
public improvement, though no part thereof is
taken as provided for under Subsection (3), is
limited to injuries that would be actionable at
common law, or where there has been some
physical disturbance of a right, either public or
private, which the owner enjoys in connection
with his property and which gives it additional
value. A definite physical injury cognizable to
the senses and with a perceptible effect on the
present market value is required. Where there
was no physical injury to condemnees' remaining home tract by the building and operation of
a school on condemned land joining the home
tract, an award of damages was improper.
Board of Educ. of Logan City School Dist. v.
Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P.2d 697 (1962).
Church could not recover damages from railroad in independent action because ringing of
bells, sounding of whistles, and noises emanat-
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ing from railroad locomotives disturbed meetings and exercises conducted in church building, where there was no physical interference
with church property. Twenty-Second Corp. of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Oregon Short Line R.R., 36 Utah 238, 103 P.
243, 23 L.R.A. (n.s.) 860, 140 Am. St. R. 819
(1909).
Except for provisions contained in Utah
Const., Art. I, Sec. 22, action would not lie for
mere consequential injuries to real property by
reason of construction and operation of railroad. O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R., 38
Utah 475, 114 P. 127 (1911).
Action may be maintained for damages from
depreciation in value of property as result of
construction and operation of railroad in street
in front ofit. Johnson v. Utah-Idaho Cent. Ry.,
68 Utah 309, 249 P. 1036 (1926).
Cost of restoration was proper, but not only,
means of as~ertaining damages under Subsection (3); restoration-costs measure of damages
was appropriate only when such costs accurately measured decrease in market value of
property damaged but not taken; difference in
market value before and after condemnation
rather than cost of restoration was proper measure of damages to remaining portion of farm
where taking for widening of highway left
basement house on remaining portion in close
proximity to highway, although not uninhabitable. State v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P.2d
113 (1948), distinguished, State Rd. Comm'n v.
Fox, 30 Utah 2d 194, 515 P.2d 450 (1973).
In respect to Subsection (2), although some
things upon remaining land might become
utterly useless as result of taking, such injury
became element to be considered in measuring
damage to remaining land, rather than to be
considered as property taken as contemplated
by former Subsection (1). State v. Ward, 112
Utah 452, 189 P.2d 113 (1948).
Award of severance damages amounting to
$3.00 per acre more than amount fixed as
value of better land taken clearly showed that
the verdict was given either under the influence of passion and prejudice or under a lack of
understanding of the law as it applied to severance damages, and was set aside. State ex rel.
Rd. Comm'n v. Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448
P.2d 347 (1968).

Definitions.
Compensation within meaning of this section contemplates money. Oregon Short Line
R.R. v. Fox, 28 Utah 311, 78 P. 800 (1904).
Owner is entitled to compensation in money,
and need not accept any substitute therefor,
such as conjoint possession or occupancy, subordinate to condemner's use. Bingham & G.
Ry. v. North Utah Mining Co. of Bingham, 49
Utah 125, 162 P. 65 (1916); Shurtleff v. Salt
Lake City, 96 Uta~ 21, 82 P.2d 561 (1938).
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A standard of what is "just compensation" is
the ordinary case in the market value of the
property taken; however, where proof of market value is not readily ascertainable because
there is little possibility of a sale on an open
market, opinion evidence of what the property
would probably sell for on the market if there
were others who could use it would be a proper
basis for determining such value. Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 352 P.2d
693 (1960).
Where home, situated on one-acre plot adjoining ranch, was held in personal ownership
while 2500 acre ranch was titled in corporation
in which homeowner held stock, the home was
not "part of a larger parcel" within Subsection
(2), and jury was not authorized to consider
adverse effect upon residence of condemnation
of adjoining ranch property. Utah State Rd.
Comm'n v. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 888 (Utah
1975).
To deprive one of the ordinary beneficial use
and enjoyment of his property is, in law, equivalent to the taking of it, and is as much a taking within contemplation of constitutional provisions relative thereto as though the property
itself were actually taken. Oregon Short Line
R.R. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 P. 732 (1905).
Where owner continues in use and enjoyment of his property and property rights after
completion of public improvement to same extent and for same purpose as before, his property has not been "taken" within Utah Const.,
Art. I, Sec. 22, and it cannot be "damaged"
within that provision except by the invasion of
a theoretical legal right. Salt Lake City v. East
Jordan Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 126, 121 P. 592
(1911).

Evidence.
Exclusion of plan of house contemplated being built upon existing basement house on remaining land, as well as rejection of expert testimony as to feasibility of using basement
house or tearing it down, held not prejudicial.
State v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P.2d 113
(1948), distinguished, State Rd. Comm'n v.
Fox, 30 Utah 2d 194, 515 P.2d 450 (1973).
Property owner's testimony regarding offers
made to him by a third party to buy subject
property in condemnation proceeding and
amount of those offers constituted hearsay and
was properly excluded by trial court. Utah
Dep't ofTransp. v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031 (Utah
1984).
In proceeding by town to condemn waters of
spring, testimony of owner of spring, on crossexamination, that fifteen years before filing
declaration of homestead he had stated value
of land and spring to be much less than he
testified their value to be at trial was improperly elicited from him on cross-examination,
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evidence being too remote. Town of Tremonton
v. Johnston, 49 Utah 307, 164 P. 190 (1917).
Jury verdict was not supported by evidence
where it awarded compensation in a condemnation proceeding in an amount lower than
any of estimates introduced into evidence.
Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031
(Utah 1984).
The rules for the admission of opinion evidence as to market value in condemnation proceedings are those applicable in other cases.
Such evidence cannot be based on a premise
not established by evidence; it must not be immaterial and irrelevant, and it must be predicated upon some proper foundation. Provo
River Water Users' Ass'n v. Carlson, 103 Utah
93, 133 P.2d 777 (1943).

Grades of streets and sidewalks.
Abutting owner's cause of action for damages caused by change of street grade arose
under Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 22, not under
R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 282 authorizing recovery of damages under such circumstances;
statute was not controlling or even material to
action at bar. Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40
Utah 221, 120 P. 503, 37 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1115
(1911). Also see Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32
Utah 253, 90 P. 395, 10 L.R.A. (n.s.) 483, 125
Am. St. R. 859 (1907) and Hempstead v. Salt
Lake City, 32 Utah 261, 90 P. 397 (1907).
Consequential damages to property which
are caused by making public improvements are
recoverable under Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 22,
and not by virtue of statute, and property
owner was not prevented from recovering such
damages by reason of having paid special tax
levied for improvements. Coalter v. Salt Lake
City, 40 Utah 293, 120 P. 851 (1912).
Under Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 22, if city, by
establishing a first or an initial grade of street,
injuriously affects property of adjoining or
abutting landowner, such owner is entitled to
be compensated for such damages. Richards v.
Salt Lake City, 49 Utah 28, 161 P. 680 (1916).
Where plaintiff purchased and improved lot
after street grade had been established and after major portion thereof had been lowered approximately to established grade, except space
for sidewalk which had been left in its natural
state and was considerably higher than portion
of street which had been brought to grade, such
property owner could not recover from city for
damage to property by bringing sidewalk to
established grade. Coalter v. Salt Lake City, 40
Utah 293, 120 P. 851 (1912).
Change of grade of street by construction of
railroad may be considered to show that
owner's property was thereby depreciated in
value. Jordan v. Utah Ry., 47 Utah 519, 156 P.
939 (1916).
How determined.
Determination where proffered sales meet

test of reasonable comparability so as to be admissible as having a bearing on market value
of condemned property is left to discretion of
trial court. Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 694
P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984).
An expert witness in a condemnation case
may support his opinion as to the value of
lands taken by testifying to other sales of land
in the locality if the other transactions meet
the test of reasonable comparability. State ex
rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317,
366 P.2d 76 (1961).
A sale of land to the state for highway purposes, by agreement of the parties, to avoid a
condemnation suit is a forced sale and therefore is not admissible in evidence to show the
value of other similar property being condemned. State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v.
Christensen, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371 P.2d 552
(1962).
Whether evidence of the value of other property should be admitted to show the value of
the land taken, or the benefit conferred upon
contiguous land in the same tract, not taken,
depends upon whether the pieces of land are
sufficiently similar in character, location, and
other factors which would influence value. The
trial court's determination as to the admissibility of this evidence should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. State ex rel Rd. Comm'n
v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d 317, 452 P.2d 872 (1969);
State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d
295, 495 P.2d 817 (1972).
Where contract between grantor and city
with reference to conveyance of right of way to
city for construction of drainage canal recited
that consideration was $1.00 and covenants of
grantee to do work in manner not to damage
property of grantor, grantor was fully compensated and neither he nor his successors had
right to again collect for the right of way.
Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City, 87
Utah 370, 49 P.2d 405 (1935).
Where property is condemned for purpose of
joint use or use in common, whole matter of
determining what is reasonable compensation
is regulated according to rules of equity.
Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall
Consol. Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 174 P. 172
(1918).
Evidence attempting to prove the value of
water rights by showing the uses to which the
water was put, the cost of replacement of the
water, and of comparable sales, was admissible
where there were little or no sales on the open
market that would establish a market value in
the usual sense of that term. Salt Lake City
Corp. v. Utah Wool Pulling Co., 566 P.2d 1240
(Utah 1977).
In a condemnation proceeding, evidence regarding the "highest and best use" of subject
property must come from properly qualified ex-
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pert witnesses; ownership of property alone
does not qualify a person as an expert to give
such opinion. Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Jones,
694 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984).
In railroad's proceedings to condemn land,
court properly permitted road, on cross-examination of landowner's witness, to show that
witness had option to purchase land at certain
price. Ogden L. & I. Ry. v. Jones, 51 Utah 62,
168 P. 548 (1917).
In eminent domain cases, the qualification of
witnesses to express opinion as to market
value necessarily is question to be largely determined by trial judge, and if it is shown that
witness is competent to express opinion as to
values, no matter what source of qualifying information may be, he should be permitted to
testify. Salt Lake & U.R.R. v. Schramm, 56
Utah 53, 189 P. 90 (1920).
Trial court was in error in refusing to allow
expert appraiser called by defendant in condemnation proceedings to give his opinion as to
the value of condemned property where such
witness, while attempting to establish his expertise on direct examination, was subjected to
premature cross-examination by condemner
and to questions interjected by the court going
to such witness' credibility. Board of Educ. v.
Bothwell & Swaner Co., 16 Utah 2d 341, 400
P.2d 568 (1965).
Verdict awarding damages slightly in excess
of damage testified to by property owner's expert witnesses was not excessive, since amount
awarded was testified to by owner who was familiar with land in question. State ex rel. Rd.
Comm'n v. Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P.2d
507 (1970).
Where an owner is deprived of his property
rights in condemnation proceedings he should
be compensated for the inherent value of his
property in cases where there is no readily ascertainable market value. Sigurd City v. State,
105 Utah 278, 142 P.2d 154 (1943).
The value of condemned land is to be based
on the market value, but not on expert opinion
as to how much the property would produce
over a period of years. State v. Noble, 6 Utah
2d 40, 305 P.2d 495 (1957).
In action by railroad to condemn land, testimony of landowner who occupied and used
premises all her life, and had been interested
in making inquiry as to its value, held properly
admitted. Salt Lake & U.R.R. v. Schramm, 56
Utah 53, 189 P. 90 (1920).
Owner's opinion as to value of his property
·which was more than twice the amount of the
highest estimate of the expert witnesses was
suffused with self-interest and was incompetent as having no probative value. Utah State
Rd. Comm'n v. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 888
(Utah 1975).
Condemnee should not have been allowed to
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testify as to value of land to him; such testimony was not tantamount to a statement of his
belief as to its fair market value. Utah State
Rd. Comm'n v. Johnson, 550 P.2d 216 (Utah
1976).
Value of landowner's property is not increased because of high rentals nor lessened
because of low rentals, but rather the landowner should receive the reasonable market
value of his property, considering its highest
and best use. State Rd. Comm'n v. Brown, 531
P.2d 1294 (Utah 1975).
In determining question of just compensation for property taken, testimony of contractor
and builder, who had constructed buildings in
various parts of state, and whose business it
was to be posted as to values, held properly
admitted. Salt Lake & U.R.R. v. Schramm, 56
Utah 53, 189 P. 90 (1920).

Injunction.
Contractor and individual members of former State Road Commission could be enjoined
from constructing viaduct along portion of
street where no condemnation proceedings had
been initiated and landowner's only other remedy was to present claim to Board of Examiners. State v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 94
Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1937).
Instructions.
Instructions on damages were proper where
they were such that the jury understood and
applied the correct measure of damages. The
assessment of damages for the land actually
taken was based on the fair cash market value
on the date of condemnation and the assessment of severance damages to the remainder
was based on the difference between its fair
cash market value before and after the taking.
State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Peterson, 12 Utah
2d 317, 366 P.2d 76 (1961).
In eminent domain case, court's charge to
jury that, in passing on question of market
value, they should take into consideration existing business or wants of community correctly stated law under circumstances and conditions in record. Salt Lake & U.R.R. v.
Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 P. 90 (1920).
Pipelines.
In ascertaining amount of compensation to
which landowner in whose lands perpetual
easement for laying pipeline was granted, it
was not value of right of way of easement acquired, but value of lands, or interest therein
taken from owner and damage to lands injuriously affected and not taken. Wasatch Gas Co.
v. Bouwhuis, 82 Utah 573, 26 P.2d 548 (1933).
Railroads.
Where a railroad company, on constructing a
line across a landowner's premises, abandoned
an old line across the same premises a mile
distant, the railroad was not entitled to have
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any benefit from the abandonment of the old
line set off against the damage done the land
adjoining the new line, the benefit which it
could set off being only such as inured to the
land adjacent to the right of way sought to be
condemned, the railroad being under no obligation to relinquish its old right of way. Oregon
Short Line R.R. v. Fox, 28 Utah 311, 78 P. 800
(1904).
In action by railroad to condemn certain
strip of ground used for school purposes to be
used for railroad, measure of damages was
diminution in value of property when used for
school purposes which was caused by construction and operation of railroad. San Pedro, L.A.
& S.L.R.R. v. Board of Educ., 35 Utah 13, 99 P.
263 (1909).
In case of a steam railroad, neither emission
of smoke nor noise incident to operation of
trains can be shown as a separate and independent element of damages. But the casting of
cinders or offensive matter upon property and
polluting the atmosphere with smoke may be
considered insofar as that affects value of property and tends to depreciate it, but rule is different with regard to noise necessarily incident
to operation of trains. Jordan v. Utah Ry., 47
Utah 519, 156 P. 939 (1916).
Plaintiffs property is "damaged" within the
meaning of Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 22, by
erection of a viaduct by a railroad, as required
by city ordinance, for which he is entitled to
compensation. Cook v. Salt Lake City, 48 Utah
58, 157 P. 643 (1916).
General benefits as contradistinguished
from special benefits should not be offset
against the damages, if any, sustained by that
portion of the land not taken or appropriated
by condemner. Therefore, general benefits
from establishment of a railroad cannot be deducted from the damages to owners whose land
was taken for right of way. Salt Lake & U.R.R.
v. Butterfield, 46 Utah 431, 150 P. 931 (1915).
In case of a steam railroad, measure of recovery is the depreciation in the market value of
property, if any, produced by careful construction and operation of the railroad. Whatever
legitimately affects value of property may be
considered in determining depreciation or appreciation thereof, but the several elements depreciating the value may not be considered as
separate and independent items of damage.
Jordan v. Utah Ry., 47 Utah 519, 156 P. 939
(1916).
If railroad company occupies landowner's
premises in an amount in excess of the land
described in deed by landowner to railroad
company, railroad should reimburse him for
the market value of the property taken and for
any damage to the remaining property as a
result of that taking, if any such damage there

be. Finlayson v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 110
Utah 319, 172 P.2d 142 (1946).
School property.
Public school property should be taken and
compensated for the same as if it had been
taken from a private owner. State ex rel. Road
Comm'n v. Salt Lake City Pub. Bd. of Educ., 13
Utah 2d 56, 368 P.2d 468 (1962).
Types or elements of damages.
Damages arising out of carelessness or negligence or indifference in construction of a utility upon land taken for public use are not damages contemplated by statutes as recoverable
under principles of law pertaining to eminent
domain proceedings. Thomas E. Jeremy Estate
v. Salt Lake City, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d 405
(1935).
Where defendants were planning to develop
a subdivision and their application to county
planning commission was deferred at request
of state road commission for two years, and
where soon after the application was approved
the road commission condemned a portion of
defendants' proposed development, defendants
were not entitled to claim as damages the expenses they had incurred for platting, taxes,
and delay during the period the application
had been delayed by the county planning commission. State ex rel. Road Comm'n v.
Bettilyon's, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 135, 405 P.2d 420
(1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1010, 86 S. Ct.
619, 15 L. Ed. 2d 526 (1966).
In determining whether item is a fixture and
hence compensable in land condemnation case,
court would apply general three-way test: (1)
manner in which item is attached or annexed
to realty, (2) whether item is adaptable to particular use of realty, and (3) intention of
annexor to make item a permanent part of realty; building and equipment therein, designed
and used solely for purpose of prefabricating
houses, were fixtures and hence compensable
under statute in light of evidence that machines were all bolted to floor or walls of building and were integrated with each other in
particular use and were intended to be part
and parcel of plant. State v. Papanikolas, 19
Utah 2d 153, 427 P.2d 749 (1967).
Fixtures are properly included in the value
of the real estate; they are not to be appraised
separately and added to the value of the real
estate. State ex rel. Road Comm'n v. Brown,
531 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1975).
Disallowance of damages for increased road
noise due to condemnation of frontage and subsequent movement of highway closer to condemnee's house was not error since all damages caused by taking or severing of land or
manner of construction of improvement are
consequential and not within constitutional
provision (Art. I, Sec. 22) unless they are such
as would be actionable at common law or
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would affect land physically; to recover damages for taking of private property plaintiff had
to show some physical injury or damage to
property itself and damages did not include
something which merely affects senses of persons who use property. State ex rel. Rd.
Comm'n v. Williams, 22 Utah 2d 331,452 P.2d
881 (1969), explained, State Rd. Comm'n v.
Rohan, 26 Utah 2d 202, 487 P.2d 857 (1971).
Intangible factors such as increased noise
from new highway should not be segregated
and a separate money value placed thereon in
arriving at compensation to be paid for condemnation; this is true even where there has
been an actual taking of property. It is proper
to take intangible factors into account in arriving at market value of property so long as a
separate money value is not placed thereon.
State Rd. Comm'n v. Rohan, 26 Utah 2d 202,
487 P.2d 857 (1971).
Store manager should not have been permitted to testify as to cost and depreciated value of
personal property and fixtures without differentiating between them, since personal property and the cost of removing it are not elements of damage. State ex rel. Road Comm'n v.
Brown, 531 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1975).
Order demanding that owners of condemned
property show cause why they had not removed
personal property from the condemned realty
or declare whether it was abandoned was not a
taking or damaging of property without just
compensation as covered under Utah Const.,
Art. I, Sec. 22, and there was no obligation on
the state to pay the cost ofremoving personalty
from the condemned land. Utah Rd. Comm'n v.
Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917 (1963).
Although one whose land is condemned must
bear the expense of removing his property from
the land, contractor who removed irrigation
pump, and demanded payment ofremoval costs
as a prerequisite to the return of the pump,
was liable in damages for conversion. Richins
v. Industrial Constr. Inc., 502 F.2d 1051 (10th
Cir. 1974).
Under Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 22, owner of
property entered upon and appropriated to
public use without compliance therewith may
waive tort and sue for compensation. Salt Lake
Inv. Co. v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 46 Utah
203, 148 P. 439 (1915), afl'd, 246 U.S. 446, 38
S. Ct. 348, 62 L. Ed. 823 (1918).

Verdict.
This section requires jury verdict set forth
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both fair market value and severance damages
where there is clear testimony concerning both
values. Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 694
P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984).

Water rights.
In proceeding to obtain perm1ss1on to enlarge certain irrigating canals belonging to irrigation company, held irrigation company was
limited in its recovery by amount of damages
suffered, and could not recover for any benefit
plaintiff might receive. Tanner v. Provo Bench
Canal & Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 P.
584 (1911), afl'd, 239 U.S. 323, 36 S. Ct. 101, 60
L. Ed. 307 (1915).
In proceeding by city against irrigation company to obtain right to enlarge irrigating canal
owned by defendant so as to convey water from
river for use of its inhabitants, measure of
damages to which irrigation company was entitled was amount of decrease, if any, in value
of use of canal for canal purposes, and use by
city for its purposes being exercised jointly
with use of defendant for its canal purposes.
Salt Lake City v. East Jordan Irrigation Co.,
40 Utah 126, 121 P. 592 (1911).
In proceeding to obtain permission to enlarge certain irrigating canals belonging to irrigation company, that defendants would be affected in control of canals and in making repairs if any were necessary, held not to entitle
defendants to substantial damages, where defendants were neither unduly interfered with
nor hampered in their control work of canals,
and hence could not be injured or damaged in
that regard. Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal &
Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 P. 584 (1911),
afl'd, 239 U.S. 323, 36 S. Ct. 101, 60 L. Ed. 307
(1915).
Present and future damages resulting from
seepage from properly constructed canal are
recoverable. Utah Lake Irrigation Co. v.
Jensen, 49 Utah 19, 161 P. 677 (1916).
Where water rights taken, measure of damages is value of water for purposes to which it
was adapted, as well as the uses to which it
had been put. Sigurd City v. State, 105 Utah
278, 142 P.2d 154 (1943); Moyle v. Salt Lake
City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P.2d 882 (1947).
Water rights appurtenant to the condemned
property are entitled to be valued in relation to
such property. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Utah
Wool Pulling Co., 566 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1977).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Comment, Highway
Noise Damage and Utah Eminent Domain
Law, 1972 Utah L. Rev. 116.

Eminent Domain: Proving Highest and Best
Use of Undeveloped Land in Utah, 1973 Utah
L. Rev. 705.
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State Condemnation Proceedings and the
Loss of Saleable Water Assets, 1974 Utah L.
Rev. 92.
Eminent Domain Compensation in Western
States: A Critique of the Fair Market Value
Model, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 429.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain § 266 et seq.
C.J.S. - 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 96
et seq.
A.L.R. - Evidentiary effect of view by jury
in condemnation case, 1 A.L.R.3d 1397.
Use or improvement of highway as establishing grade necessary to entitle abutting owner
to compensation on subsequent change, 2
A.L.R.3d 985.
Valuation at time of original wrongful entry
by condemner or at time of subsequent initiation of condemnation proceedings, 2 A.L.R.3d
1038.
Restrictive covenant or right to enforcement
thereof as compensable property right, 4
A.L.R.3d 1137.
Depreciation in value, from project for which
land is condemned, as factor in fixing compensation, 5 A.L.R.3d 901.
Zoning as factor in determination of damages in eminent domain, 9 A.L.R.3d 291.
How to obtain a jury trial in eminent domain: waiver, 12 A.L.R.3d 7.
Admissibility of hearsay evidence as to comparable sales of other land as basis for expert's
opinion as to land value, 12 A.L.R.3d 1064.
Deduction of benefits in determining compensation or damages in proceedings involving
opening, widening, or otherwise altering highway, 13 A.L.R.3d 1149.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of argument or evidence as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 17
A.L.R.3d 1449.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of argument or evidence as to source
of funds to pay for property, 19 A.L.R.2-d 694.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
A.L.R.3d 1081.
Propriety and effect of argument or evidence

78-34-11.

as to financial status of parties in eminent domain proceeding, 21 A.L.R.3d 936.
Existence of restrictive covenant as element
in fixing value of property condemned, 22
A.L.R.3d 961.
Admissibility, on issue of value of condemned real property, of rental value of other
real property, 23 A.L.R.3d 724.
Admissibility of photographs or models of
property condemned, 23 A.L.R.3d 825.
Cost of substitute facilities as measure of
compensation paid to state or municipality for
condemnation of public property, 40 A.L.R.3d
143.
Measure and elements of damage for limitation of access caused by conversion of conventional road into limited-access highway, 42
A.L.R.3d 148.
Measure of damages for condemnation of
cemetery lands, 42 A.L.R.3d 1314.
Traffic noise and vibration from highway as
element of damages in eminent domain, 51
A.L.R.3d 860.
Condemned property's location in relation to
proposed site of building as factor in fixing
compensation, 51 A.L.R.3d 1050.
Loss of liquor license as compensable in condemnation proceeding, 56 A.L.R.3d 581.
Goodwill or "going concern" value as element of lessee's compensation for taking leasehold in eminent domain, 58 A.L.R.3d 581.
Compensation for diminution in value of the
remainder of property resulting from taking or
use of adjoining land ·of others for the same
undertaking, 59 A.L.R.3d 488.
Consideration of fact that landowner's remaining land will be subject to special assessment as factor in fixing compensation, 59
A.L.R.3d 534.
Condemner's liability for costs of condemnee's expert witnesses, 68 A.L.R.3d 546.
Right in eminent domain proceeding to call
as witness expert engaged but not called as
witness by opposing party, 71 A.L.R.3d 1119.
Determination of just compensation for condemnation of billboards or other advertising
signs, 73 A.L.R.3d 1122.
Key Numbers. - Eminent Domain e=> 122
et seq.

When right to damages deemed to have accrued.

For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto
shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the service of summons, and its
actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all property
to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken,
but injuriously affected, in all cases where such damages are allowed, as
provided in the next preceding section [§ 78-34-10]. No improvements put
upon the property subsequent to the date of service of summons shall be
included in the assessment of compensation or damages.
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-11.

Cross-References. Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.P.

78-34-11
Service of summons,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Date of accrual.
-Interest
on award.
-Value and damages.
Evidence of value.
-Comparable sales.
-Potential
development.
-Rents.
-Subsequent
improvements.
Purpose of section.
-Prevention
of damage enhancement.

Date of accrual.
-Interest on award.
In suit by abutting owner to recover consequential damages to real property caused by
change in street grade by city, plaintiff was
entitled to recover interest on damages from
time of completion of grade injuring property.
Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 253, 90 P.
395, 10 L.R.A. (n.s.) 483, 125 Am. St. R. 859
(1907).
In eminent domain proceeding, interest on
award should not be computed from date of
commencement of action, but rather from date
of order of occupancy. Salt Lake & U.R.R. v.
Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 P. 90 (1920).
Where the owners of property condemned for
railroad purposes remained in possession and
had the use of the property until the final order
of condemnation, the service of summons was
not a "taking" of the property, and hence they
were not entitled to interest on the assessment
of condemnation from the date of the service of
summons to verdict, less rents and other benefits of possession received by them during that
period. Oregon Short Line R.R. v. Jones, 29
Utah 147, 80 P. 732 (1905).
In action by railroad to condemn certain
strip of ground used for school purposes to be
used for railroad, interest on damages for land
condemned should have been computed from
time railroad took possession of land, arid not
from date of judgment. San Pedro, L.A. &
S.L.R.R. v. Board of Educ., 35 Utah 13, 99 P.
263 (1909).
Interest is recoverable only from the time of
taking possession of the property and not from
the commencement of the action. State v. Peek,
1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 (1953).
-Value and damages.
Property owners were entitled to compensation and damages based on value of their condemned property as of date on which state's

right to condemn was finally determined,
which was over seven years after service of
summons, where delay was due to federal court
actions and injunctions resulting from property
owners' efforts to compel state to comply with
federal law in condemning their property for
purposes of constructing a belt-loop as part of
interstate freeway system. Utah State Rd.
Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984)
(two justices concurring, one justice concurring
separately, and two justices dissenting).
If condemnation proceedings are instituted
against trustee in deed of trust and summons
is served upon him, and afterwards real owners
enter their appearance and waive summons,
the measure of damages is value of land at
time of entry of appearance, and not at date of
summons issued against trustee. Oregon S.L.
& U.N. Ry. v. Mitchell, 7 Utah 505, 27 P. 693
(1891).
In proceeding by railroad to condemn land,
trial court properly fixed date that landowner's
counsel entered voluntary appearance in open
court which amounted to general appearance
as time for determining the value ofland taken
and the damages to the portion not taken.
Ogden L. & I. Ry. v. Jones, 51 Utah 62, 168 P.
548 (1917).
In condemnation of water right of way, value
and damages should be measured as of time of
service of summons, subject to proof that value
or damages, either or both, have been lost as
result of the condemnation. Hyde Park Town v.
Chambers, 99 Utah 118, 104 P.2d 220 (1939).
If farm land similar to that taken is not
available at time of trial, but was available on
date summons was served, no severance damages based on theory that farm was a unit operation can be awarded. State v. Cooperative
Sec. Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints, 122 Utah 134,247 P.2d 269 (1952).
Service of summons is controlling date for
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valuation purposes. State v. Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d
167, 397 P.2d 463 (1964).
Value of condemned property under this section was "actual value" at time of service of
summons, including any enhancement in value
brought about by project requiring taking of
property in question, as long as this enhancement took place prior to service of summons.
State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d
317, 452 P.2d 872 (1969).

Evidence of value.
-Comparable
sales.
Sales of the same property at any reasonable
time in the past is relevant evidence on the
issue of present value. Weber Basin Water
Conservancy Dist. v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29,347
P.2d 862 (1959).
-Potential
development.
All factors bearing upon value of property at
time of service of summons should be given
consideration, including any potential development in the area reasonably to be expected.
Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 (1959).

'

-Subsequent
improvements.
Evidence that buildings on condemned land
had been razed and the land converted to a
parking lot which resulted in a higher income
than was being realized from the buildings is
irrelevant as to value of property on date of
taking. Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui Inv.
Inc., 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974).
Purpose of section.
-Prevention
of damage enhancement.
The purpose of this section is to forestall the
possibility of making improvements on the
property after notice of condemnation in order
to enhance damages. Redevelopment Agency v.
Mitsui Inv. Inc., 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain § 152.
C.J.S. - 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 185.
A.L.R. - Validity of "freezing" ordinances

78-34-12.

-Rents.
For the purpose of proving value, it is proper
to show rental value of premises and what
rents were paid therefor at and for reasonable
time before action was commenced. Ogden L. &
I. Ry. v. Jones, 51 Utah 62, 168 P. 548 (1917).

or statutes preventing prospective condemnee
from improving, or otherwise changing, the
condition of his property, 36 A.L.R.3d 751.
Key Numbers. - Eminent Domain
124.

When title sought found defective -Another
tion allowed.

ac-

If the title attempted to be acquired is found to be defective from any cause,
the plaintiff may again institute proceedings to acquire the same as in this
chapter prescribed.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-12.

Cross-References.
40 of this title.

-

Quiet title, Chapter

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. Domain § 130.

78-34-13.

C.J.S. - 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 449.
Key Numbers. - Eminent Domain~ 317.

26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent

Payment of award cure fencing.

Bond from railroad to se-

The plaintiff must, within thirty days after final judgment, pay the sum of
money assessed; and, if the plaintiff is a railroad company, it shall also execute to the defendant a bond, with sureties, to be determined and approved by
the court or judge, conditioned that the plaintiff will build proper fences
within six months from the time the railroad is built on or over the land
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taken. In an action on the bond all damages sustained and the cost of the
construction of such fences may be recovered.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 101-34-13.
Cross-References. - Cities may require
railroads to fence right of way, § 10-8-35.
Contracts ofsuretyship, § 31A-22-101 et seq.

Public Service Commission power to require
fencing, §§ 56-2-6 to 56-2-12.
Requirement that railroads fence right of
way, § 56-1-13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
School property.
Public school property should be taken and
compensated for the same as if it had been

taken from a private owner. State ex rel. Rd.
Comm'n v. Salt Lake City Pub. Bd. of Educ., 13
Utah 2d 56, 368 P.2d 468 (1962).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain §§ 262, 263.

78-34-14.

C.J.S. - 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 191
et seq.
Key Numbers. - Eminent Domain eco160.

Distribution of award - Execution ment of proceedings on failure to pay.

Annul-

Payment may be made to the defendants entitled thereto, or the money may
be deposited in court for the defendants and distributed to those entitled
thereto. If the money is not so paid or deposited, the defendants may have
execution as in civil cases; and if the money cannot be made on execution, the
court upon a showing to that effect must set aside and annul the entire proceedings, and restore possession of the property to the defendants, if possession has been taken by the plaintiff.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-14.

Cross-References. - Deposit in court, Rule
67, U.R.C.P.
Execution, Rule 69, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Enforcement of judgment or order.
Judgment or order entered in condemnation
proceedings may be enforced by proceedings in
form to punish for contempt of court. Ketchum
Coal Co. v. Christensen, 48 Utah 214, 159 P.
541 (1916); Ketchum Coal Co. v. District
Court, 48 Utah 342, 159 P. 737, 4 A.L.R. 619
(1916).

The enforcement of a judgment or order entered in a condemnation proceeding may be
compelled by mandamus. Ketchum Coal Co. v.
Christensen, 48 Utah 214, 159 P. 541 (1916);
Ketchum Coal Co. v. District Court, 48 Utah
342, 159 P. 737, 4 A.L.R. 619 (1916).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 30 C.J.S Eminent Domain § 332.
A.L.R. - Payment or deposit of award in

court as affecting condemner's right of appeal,
40 A.L.R.3d 203.
Key Numbers. - Eminent Domain eco249.
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78-34-15. Judgment
Effect.

of condemnation

-

Recordation

-

When payments have been made and the bond given, if the plaintiff elects
to give one, as required by the last two preceding sections [§§ 78-34-13,
78-34-14], the court must make a final judgment of condimnation, which must
describe the property condemned and the purpose of such condemnation. A
copy of the judgment must be filed in the office of the recorder of the county,
and thereupon the property described therein shall vest in the plaintiff for the
purpose therein specified.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-15.

Cross-References.
Chapter 21 of Title 17.

County

recorder,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of court order.
Recordation.
-Failure to record.
--Constructive
notice.
-Notice of condemnation.
--Errors
in description of property.

Effect of court order.
That plaintiff in proceeding to condemn strip
of land had legal right to condemn, and that
condemnation was for public use, was settled
by lower court's order of condemnation authorizing plaintiff to take possession of and improve strip. Ketchum Coal Co. v. District
Court, 48 Utah 342, 159 P. 737, 4 A.L.R. 619
(1916).
Recordation.
-Failure

to record.

--Constructive
notice.
Where plaintiff railroad condemned a strip
of land adjacent to its tract in 1897, but the
decree was not recorded until 1952, it was held
in a quiet title action between plaintiff and
owner of tract of land in which plaintiffs strip

was located that the defendant had constructive notice of plaintiffs claim since plaintiffs
guy wires and poles were on the strip and visible and also because in earlier deeds in defendant's chain of title this decree of condemnation was mentioned. Salt Lake, G. & W.R.R. v.
Allied Materials Co., 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P.2d
883 (1955).

-Notice

of condemnation.

--Errors
in description of property.
Where the description of the property condemned, as set out in the judgment, is so erroneous that it does not reasonably advise of the
subject matter of the condemnation proceeding,
the recording of the judgment does not constitute notice of the condemnation to subsequent
good faith purchasers. Ash v. State, 572 P.2d
1374 (Utah 1977).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain § 443 et seq.

C.J.S. - 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 319
et seq.
Key Numbers. - Eminent Domain ¢" 241.
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Substitution of bond for deposit paid into court
- Abandonment of action by condemner - Conditions of dismissal.

In the event that no order is entered by the court permitting payment of
said deposit on account of the just compensation to be awarded in the proceeding within thirty (30) days following its deposit, the court may, on application
of the condemning authority, permit the substitution of a bond in such
amount and with such sureties as shall be determined and approved by the
court. Condemner, whether a public or private body, may, at any time prior to
final payment of compensation and damages awarded the defendant by the
court or jury, abandon the proceedings and cause the action to be dismissed
without prejudice, provided, however, that as a condition of dismissal
condemner first compensate condemnee for all damages he has sustained and
also reimburse him in full for all reasonable and necessary expenses actually
incurreq by condemnee because of the filing of the action by condemner, including attorneys fees.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-16; L. 1967, ch. 220, § 1.

Cross-References.
ship, § 31A-22-101.

-

Contracts of surety-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Abandonment.
Condemner need not voluntarily dismiss proceedings under Rule 41, U.R.C.P., to incur liability under this section; even informal aban-

donment of proceedings will give rise to liability to condemnee for attorney fees and legal
expenses incurred. Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - The Condemnor's Liability for Damages Arising Through Instituting, Litigating, or Abandoning Eminent Domain Proceedings, 1967 Utah L. Rev. 548.
Attorney's Fees in Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev.
553.

78-34-17.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain §§ 262, 453 et seq.
C.J.S. - 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 186;
30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 334 et seq.
Key Numbers. - Eminent Domain ec, 244,
246.

Rights of cities and towns not affected.

Nothing in this chapter must be construed to abrogate or repeal any statute
providing for the taking of property in any city or town for street purposes.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-17.

78-34-18.

When right of way acquired - Duty of party acquiring.

A party obtaining a right of way shall without delay construct such crossings as may be required by the court or judge, and shall keep them and the
way itself in good repair.
523

78-34-19

JUDICIAL CODE

History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-18.

78-34-19.

Cross-References. and towns, § 10-8-25.

Crosswalks in cities

Action to set aside condemnation for failure to
commence or complete construction within reasonable time.

(1) In an action to condemn property, if the court makes a finding of what is
a reasonable time for commencement of construction and use of all the property sought to be condemned and the construction and use is not accomplished
within the time specified, the condemnee may file an action against the\ condemnor to set aside the condemnation of the entire parcel or any portion
thereof upon which construction and use was to have taken place.
(2) In such action, if the court finds that the condemnor, without reasonable
justification, did not commence or complete construction and use within the
time specified, it shall enter judgment fixing the amount the condemnor has
paid the condemnee, as a result of condemnation and all amounts due the
condemnee as damages sustained by reason of condemnation, including damages resulting from partial completion of the contemplated use, plus all reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred by the condemnee including
attorney fees.
(3) If amounts due the condemnee under Subsection (2) of this section exceed amounts paid by the condemnor, or these amounts are equal, judgment
shall be entered in favor of the condemnee, which judgment shall describe the
property condemned and award judgment for any amounts due condemnee. A
copy of the judgment shall be filed in the office of the county recorder of the
county, and thereupon the property described therein shall vest in the condemnee.
(4) If amounts paid by the condemnor under Subsection (2) of this section
exceed amounts due the condemnee, judgment shall be entered describing the
property condemned and giving the condemnee 60 days from the date thereof
to pay the difference between the amounts to the condemnor. If payment is
made, the court shall amend the judgment to reflect such payment and order
the amended judgment filed with the office of the county recorder of the
county, and thereupon the property described therein shall vest in the condemnee. If payment is not made, the court shall amend the judgment to reflect
nonpayment and order the amended judgment filed with the county recorder
of the county.
History: C. 1953, 78-34-19, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 161, § 3.

78-34-20.

Cross-References.
Chapter 21 of Title 17.

County

recorder,

Sale of property acquired by eminent domain.

If the state or one of its subdivisions, at its sole discretion, declares real
property to be surplus property, not developed for the intended use, it may not
sell the property on the open market unless the following conditions are met:
(1) The real property is not property acquired by condemnation, or by
threat of condemnation, which, as used in this section, means acquisition
of real property by a subdivision of the state having the right to exercise
the power of eminent domain; or
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(2) (a) The real property has been offered for sale to the person or
entity from whom the state or one of its subdivisions acquired it, at
the highest offer with first right of refusal;
(b) The person or entity failed to accept the offer within 90 days
after notification by registered mail to the last known address; and
(c) Neither the state nor the subdivision of the state selling the
property is involved in the rezoning of the property or the acquisition
of additional property to enhance the value of the real property to be
sold.
\
This section shall only apply to property acquired after July 1, 1983.
History: C. 1953, 78-34-20, enacted
1983, ch. 155, § 1.

by L.

Cross-References. - County zoning, Chapter 27 of Title 17.
Municipal zoning, Chapter 9 of Title 10.

CHAPTER 35
EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
Section
78-35-1. Penalty for wrongful refusal to allow
writ of habeas corpus.
78-35-2. Recommitment.
78-35-3. Recommitment after discharge forbidden - Exceptions.
78-35-4. Refusing to exhibit authority for detention - Penalty.
78-35-5. Penalties for wrongful acts of defendant.
78-35-6. Judgment of ouster - Costs - Pen-

78-35-1.

Section
78-35-7.
78-35-8.
78-35-9.
78-35-10.

alty by fine where state is
party.
Judgment against director of corporation - Of induction in favor
of person entitled.
Action for damages because of usurpation - Limitation of action.
Mandamus and prohibition - Judgment.
Disobedience of writ- Punishment.

Penalty for wrongful refusal to allow writ of habeas corpus.

Any judge, whether acting individually or as a member of a court, who
wrongfully and willfully refuses to allow a writ of habeas corpus whenever
proper application for the same has been made shall forfeit and pay a sum not
exceeding $5,000 to the party thereby aggrieved.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-35-1.
Cross-References. - District court's jurisdiction to issue writs, Utah Const., Art. VIII,
Sec. 5; § 78-3-4.
Extradition, time to apply for habeas corpus
allowed, § 77-30-10.
Juvenile court power to determine custody
upon writ, § 78-3a-17.

Mental illness, writ available to one detained for, § 64-7-49.
Procedure, Rule 65B, U.R.C.P.
Supreme Court's jurisdiction to issue writs,
Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3; § 78-2-2.
Suspension prohibited except in case of rebellion or invasion, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 5.
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